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abstract
We show that female directors have a signicant impact on board inputs and rm outcomes. In a
sample of US rms, we nd that female directors have better attendance records than male directors,
male directors have fewer attendance problems the more gender-diverse the board is, and women are
more likely to join monitoring committees. These results suggest that gender-diverse boards allocate
more e¤ort to monitoring. Accordingly, we nd that chief executive o¢ cer turnover is more sensitive
to stock performance and directors receive more equity-based compensation in rms with more gender-
diverse boards. However, the average e¤ect of gender diversity on rm performance is negative. This
negative e¤ect is driven by companies with fewer takeover defenses. Our results suggest that mandating
gender quotas for directors can reduce rm value for well-governed rms.
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1. Introduction
Women hold few corporate board seats. In the US, women held 14.8% of Fortune 500
board seats in 2007 (Catalyst, 2007). The percentage of female directors in Australia, Canada,
Japan, and Europe is estimated to be 8.7%, 10.6%, 0.4%, and 8.0%, respectively (Equal Oppor-
tunity for Women in the Workplace AgencyEOWA, 2006; and European Professional Womens
NetworkEPWN, 2004). Furthermore, the majority of rms with female directors in the sam-
ples in EOWA (2006) and EPWN (2004) have only one female director, a fact that is often
regarded as evidence of tokenism (Branson, 2006; Bourez, 2005; and Corporate Women Direc-
tors InternationalCWDI, 2007). For example, in the top two hundred companies in Europe,
62% of companies have at least one female director, but only 28% have more than one in 2004
(EWPN, 2004). In Australia, 50% of ASX200 companies have at least one female director, but
only 13.5% have more than one in 2006 (EOWA, 2006). In our data, 65% of the rms have at
least one female director in 2003, but only 25% have more than one.
This situation is likely to change because boards around the world are under increasing
pressure to choose female directors. Many proposals for governance reform explicitly stress
the importance of gender diversity in the boardroom. In the UK, the Higgs report (Higgs,
2003), commissioned by the British Department of Trade and Industry, argues that diversity
could enhance board e¤ectiveness and specically recommends that rms draw more actively
from professional groups in which women are better represented [see also the subsequent Tyson
report (Tyson, 2003)]. If companies do not voluntarily reserve a minimum of 25% of their board
seats for female directors, Sweden has threatened to make gender diversity a legal requirement
(Medland, 2004). The most extreme promotion of gender diversity occurs in Norway, where
since January 2008 all listed companies must abide by a 40% gender quota for female directors
or face dissolution.1 Although it is still too early to assess the consequences of Norways unique
experiment, Spain has followed Norways lead by enacting a law requiring companies to increase
1The law was imposed in 2006 and rms were given two years to adjust. As of February 2008, 93% of the
public companies complied with the requirements, according to Statistics Norway. In April 2008, the Norwegian
government announced full compliance.
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the share of female directors to 40% by 2015.
Most of these legislative initiatives are based on the view that the presence of women on
boards could a¤ect the governance of companies in signicant ways. One argument is that
boards could enhance their e¤ectiveness by tapping broader talent pools for their directors.
The Higgs review, for example, points out that, although approximately 30% of managers in
the UK corporate sector are female, women hold only 6% of nonexecutive director positions.
Another argument is that, because they do not belong to the old boys club,female directors
could more closely correspond to the concept of the independent director emphasized in theory.
In this paper, we provide new evidence that is relevant to this debate by investigating
the hypothesis that gender diversity in the boardroom a¤ects governance in meaningful ways.
In particular, we ask the following questions. First, do measures of board inputs (director
attendance and committee assignments) vary with gender diversity? Second, does the gender
composition of the board a¤ect measures of governance, such as chief executive o¢ cer (CEO)
turnover and compensation? Finally, does the e¤ect of gender diversity on governance matter
su¢ ciently to a¤ect corporate performance?
The answers to these questions are interesting for several reasons. For example, they can help
us understand the e¤ect group composition has on board e¤ectiveness and the likely success
or failure of governance proposals advocating greater diversity. They can also shed light on
whether tokenism prevents female directors from having an impact on corporate outcomes.
We nd that gender diversity in boards has signicant e¤ects on board inputs. Women
appear to behave di¤erently than men with respect to our measure of attendance behavior.
Specically, women are less likely to have attendance problems than men. Furthermore, the
greater the fraction of women on the board is, the better is the attendance behavior of male
directors. Holding other director characteristics constant, female directors are also more likely
to sit on monitoring-related committees than male directors. In particular, women are more
likely to be assigned to audit, nominating, and corporate governance committees, although they
are less likely to sit on compensation committees than men are.
Women also appear to have a signicant impact on board governance. We nd direct
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evidence that more diverse boards are more likely to hold CEOs accountable for poor stock
price performance; CEO turnover is more sensitive to stock return performance in rms with
relatively more women on boards. In our data, this e¤ect is stronger and more robust than the
previously shown e¤ects of board independence on CEO turnover (Weisbach, 1988). We also
nd that directors in gender-diverse boards receive relatively more equity-based compensation.
We do not nd a statistically reliable relation between gender diversity and the level and
composition of CEO pay, which is consistent with our ndings that women board members are
under-represented on compensation committees and thus have less involvement in setting CEO
pay.
The evidence on the relation between gender diversity on boards and rm performance is
more di¢ cult to interpret. Although the correlation between gender diversity and either rm
value or operating performance appears to be positive at rst inspection, this correlation dis-
appears once we apply reasonable procedures to tackle omitted variables and reverse causality
problems. Our results suggest that, on average, rms perform worse the greater is the gender
diversity of the board. This result is consistent with the argument that too much board mon-
itoring can decrease shareholder value (Almazan and Suarez, 2003; and Adams and Ferreira,
2007). Thus, it is possible that gender diversity only increases value when additional board
monitoring would enhance rm value. To investigate this hypothesis, we examine whether
gender diversity a¤ects performance di¤erentially in rms with di¤erent levels of shareholder
rights, dened using the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) governance data as
in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Consistent with this hypothesis, we nd that gender
diversity has benecial e¤ects in companies with weak shareholder rights, where additional
board monitoring could enhance rm value, but detrimental e¤ects in companies with strong
shareholder rights.
Despite the importance of gender diversity in the policy debate, relatively little research
links diversity and corporate governance (for a survey of this literature, see Fields and Keys,
2003). Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) nd a positive relation between gender and ethnic
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diversity of the board and corporate performance, as proxied by Tobins Q.2 Farrell and Hersch
(2005) nd that gender systematically impacts the selection of directors to the board. They
argue that their evidence is consistent with the idea that women directors are added to the
board following internal or external calls for diversity. These papers do not fully address the
endogeneity problems that arise because of di¤erences in unobservable characteristics across
rms or reverse causality. Thus, their ndings cannot be given causal interpretations. Our
paper complements these by providing a comprehensive analysis of the consequences of gender
diversity in boards. We also pay special attention to endogeneity issues that could confound
the interpretation of the empirical ndings.
More generally, our paper contributes to the literature on the demography of organizations,
which has been studied primarily by researchers in management and organization theory and
increasingly in economics and corporate nance. Empirical papers in this tradition have looked
both at the e¤ects of demography on outcomes and at the determinants of demography in
organizations (Haveman, 1995; OReilly, Caldwell, and Barnett, 1989; Pelled, Eisenhardt, and
Xin, 1999; and Wagner, Pfe¤er, and OReilly, 1984). In the economics and nance literatures,
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) document that rms appear
to choose directors for their personal characteristics. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), Linck,
Netter, and Yang (2008), and Boone, Fields, Karpo¤, and Raheja (2007) nd that some personal
characteristics of the CEO (such as tenure and age) are related to board structure.3
Overall, our results suggest that gender-diverse boards are tougher monitors. Nevertheless,
they reveal that mandating gender quotas in the boardroom could harm well-governed rms in
which additional monitoring is counterproductive.
The structure of our paper is as follows. We discuss our data and basic facts about women
representation on corporate boards in our sample in Section 2. In Section 3, we rst examine
the relation between gender diversity and board inputs and then examine the relation between
diversity and governance. We analyze the relation between diversity and performance in Section
2Adler (2001) nds similar results, although the focus of this study is more broadly on the gender diversity
of senior management.
3See also Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2008) for an analysis of the determinants of board structure.
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4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
Our initial sample consists of an unbalanced panel of director-level data for Standard &
Poors (S&P) 500, S&P MidCaps, and S&P SmallCap rms collected by the Investor Respon-
sibility Research Center for the period 19962003. This data set is based on an IRRC annual
publication (Board Practices/Board Pay: The Structure and Compensation of Boards of Di-
rectors at S&P 1,500 Companies). It contains information on directors from company proxy
statements or annual reports, such as the directors gender, the number of other directorships
each director holds, the directors tenure as director, age, and retirement status. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that in their proxy statements companies report the
names of directors who during the previous scal year attended less than 75% of the total num-
ber of board and committee meetings they were supposed to attend. For all but two of 125,319
unique directorships, the IRRC indicates whether directors met this attendance threshold. The
IRRC data also contain a classication of director independence. Directors are classied as
independent if they have no business relation with the rm, are not related or interlocked with
management, and are not current or former employees. Directors who are not independent are
either classied as inside directors, who are current employees, or a¢ liated directors, who have
signicant business or family relations with the rm. For the years 19982003 the IRRC data
also contain information concerning memberships of directors on the nominating, compensation,
audit, and corporate governance committees.
To obtain nancial data, director and CEO compensation data, and data on CEO tenure
and reasons for CEO turnover during each scal year, we merge our data with ExecuComp. We
obtain standard industrial classication (SIC) codes and business segment data from Compustat
and stock prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Our nal sample of
complete director- and rm-level data consists of 86,714 directorships (director rm-years) in
8,253 rm-years of data on 1,939 rms. The number of observations varies across regressions
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due to multicollinearity and perfect prediction of the dependent variable.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for selected rm, board, and director characteristics. In
our analysis, we use a market-based measure of performance, a proxy for Tobins q, as well as
an accounting measure, return on assets (ROA). Our proxy for Tobins q is the ratio of the
rms market value to its book value. The rms market value is calculated as the book value
of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. ROA is the ratio of
net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations to its book value of assets.
Our measure of rm risk or volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns from
CRSP over the previous ve years.
(Insert Table 1 near here)
Directors are generally paid an annual retainer, meeting fees for attendance at board meet-
ings, and some stock-based compensation in the form of restricted shares or options. Each
director faces the same compensation schedule. We dene total (individual) director compen-
sation to be the sum of the annual retainer, the meeting fee times the number of board meetings,
and the value of all stock-based compensation. We choose to value director options using a
procedure that mirrors ExecuComps procedure for valuing options for the top ve executives
in each rm. To price the options we use the Black and Scholes formula, assuming continuously
paid dividends. Estimates of rm volatility, dividend yield, and the risk-free rate are from
ExecuComp. Expiration of director options usually occurs in ten years. We use seven years
to be consistent with ExecuComp. Total CEO compensation is item TDC1 in ExecuComp.
Fraction CEO Incentive pay is 1-(Salary+Bonus)/Total CEO Compensation. For comparison
purposes, we adjust for ination by converting all compensation variables into 2003 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), produced by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
2.1. Women in the boardroom: the basic facts
In this subsection, we use the entire IRRC database, not just the subsample for which we
have complete data, to provide a broader picture of female representation in the boardroom.
6
The key summary statistics in our subsample are not statistically di¤erent from those in the
full sample. The IRRC data set contains information on 24,820 unique directors holding a
total of 125,319 directorships (rm-year board positions). Women constitute 2,012 or 8.11% of
directors, holding 8.87% of directorships.4 Women act as inside directors in 6.64% of female
board positions, as independent directors in 84.07% of female board positions, and as a¢ liated
directors in the remainder. The primary reasons they are classied as a¢ liated are because they
provide professional services to the rm (39.75% of a¢ liated directorships); they are related to
a member of management (26.62%); and they act on behalf of a supplier (19.44%), function
as a union or large shareholder representative (15.57%), or are former employees (13.02%). In
only a few cases (0.4%) are women classied as a¢ liated because they act on behalf of a charity
that receives donations from the company.
In our sample, the percentage of board seats women occupy has increased by 25% over
time, rising from 8.10% in 1996 to 10.41% in 2003. Similarly, Catalyst (2003) nds that the
proportion of board seats women held in the Fortune 500 rose from 9.6% in 1996 to 13.6%
in 2003. The proportion of rms with only one woman on the board remained unchanged
throughout the sample period at roughly 40%. Thus, most rms with female directors have
only one and this pattern has not changed much over time.
2.2. Firms with female directors: are they di¤erent?
In Table 2, we compare the means of various rm characteristics across rm-years in which
rms have at least one woman on the board and rm-years without women for our sample
of complete data. The comparison shows that, in years in which rms have women on their
boards, rms are larger, have more business segments, have worse performance in terms of
Tobins q but have better performance in terms of ROA, have lower volatility, and have larger
boards than rms without female directors. These comparisons suggest that rmschoices to
nominate female directors could be inuenced by rm characteristics. Thus, it is important to
4These numbers are consistent with Farrell and Hersch (2005), who nd that female directors make up 8.6%
of board members in a sample of approximately three hundred unregulated Fortune 500 rms over the period
1990 to 1999.
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control for these characteristics in our analysis, as we do.5
(Insert Table 2 about here)
2.3. Methodology
When analyzing the e¤ect of women on governance, endogeneity concerns arise because
of omitted unobservable rm characteristics. Omitted variables that a¤ect both the selection
of female directors and governance choices could lead to spurious correlations between board
gender diversity and governance variables. It is plausible, for example, that some rms are
more progressive than others, so they have better governance as well as more female directors.
Under the assumption that corporate culture does not vary over the time period studied, we
use rm xed e¤ects to address the concern that omitted culture (or any other time-invariant
rm characteristic) is driving our results. Thus, whenever possible, we use rm xed e¤ects
methods to control for time-invariant unobservable rm characteristics. Although we sometimes
also report results without rm xed e¤ects for comparison, we emphasize only those results
that are robust to the inclusion of xed e¤ects.
Another concern is reverse causality. Although there are few reasons to believe that individ-
ual director attendance, committee assignments, and CEO turnover-performance sensitivities
are direct causes of changes in board gender diversity, both director compensation structure
and rm performance are likely to a¤ect both the incentives of women to join rms and the
incentives of rms to hire female directors. We address such problems by means of instrumental
variables (IV) methods. We hypothesize that the fraction of male directors with board connec-
tions to female directors could be a valid instrument for the fraction of female directors and
report IV results when appropriate. We discuss the economic logic behind our instrument and
its limitations in Section 4.
5We also nd that the proportion of women on boards varies signicantly across industries. Female directors
are less prevalent in industries that deal with infrastructure, energy, or electronics than with consumer goods.
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3. Empirical results
To examine whether gender diversity matters in terms of board governance, we examine
whether governance characteristics of boards that are more diverse are di¤erent from those
that are less diverse. We begin by examining behavior di¤erences at the individual level and
then examine board-level governance characteristics.
We rst analyze the e¤ect of gender on observable measures of board inputs: attendance
behavior and committee assignments. Attendance behavior is important from a governance
perspective because the primary way in which directors obtain necessary information to carry
out their duties is by attending board meetings. Attendance behavior is also the only measure
of individual director behavior publicly available, so we can use it to examine whether female
directors behave di¤erently than male directors. We analyze committee assignments because
many of the monitoring-related tasks, such as auditing, governance, and the selection and
compensation of executives and directors, are performed by board committees. A board member
is more likely to be inuential for governance if he or she sits on key committees.
We then investigate the e¤ect of gender diversity on board-level governance characteristics
and choices. We rst consider CEO turnover. Evidence exists that independent boards are
more likely to force CEO turnover after poor stock performance (Weisbach, 1988). Thus, if
female directors are tougher monitors, we should nd that CEO turnover is more sensitive to
performance in rms with more gender-diverse boards.
We examine the relation between diversity and equity-based compensation for directors
and CEOs, because the governance literature suggests that performance pay is an important
mechanism to ensure that directors and managers act in the interests of shareholders. We also
examine the relation between diversity and total pay, although it is less clear whether better
governance requires more or less total pay.
Although we also analyzed the relation between director independence and board size and
gender diversity, we do not show this analysis. We believe that these relations are largely
mechanical and di¢ cult to interpret. For example, suppose that, as in Norway, regulators force
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a rm that previously had no women on the board to hire at least one woman. As a consequence,
both board independence and board size would increase. Thus, although one could point to the
increase in the number of women as the cause of an increase in board size and independence,
this mechanical relation has no interesting economic implications. However, we are careful in
our analysis to control for board size and independence to ensure that the e¤ects we nd are
due to gender diversity and not those variables.
3.1. The impact of women on observable board inputs
In this subsection we analyze the impact of women directors on observable board inputs:
attendance and committee assignments.
3.1.1. Attendance: do men and women have di¤erent attendance behavior?
If gender diversity a¤ects the workings of the board, then we expect female directors to
behave di¤erently than male directors in at least some respects. Thus, we begin by analyzing
directorsattendance behavior.
We estimate a probit model in our directorship-level data in which the dependent variable
is one if the rms proxy reports that the director did not meet the SECs 75% attendance
threshold in a given year and zero otherwise. Clearly, directors do not want to be named
in proxies as having attendance problems. Thus, it is not surprising that the percentage of
observations in which directors do not meet the 75% attendance threshold is small, 2.38%.
Nevertheless, director characteristics a¤ect this extreme measure of attendance problems in
ways one would expect them to a¤ect actual attendance behavior (see Adams and Ferreira,
2008).
Because the factors that cause insiders to fail to meet the 75% attendance threshold are
unlikely to be the same as for outsiders, we restrict our sample to outside directors. We also
eliminate all observations in which the directors tenure is equal to one year. This ensures that
we do not consider directors who were appointed in the middle of the previous year. These
sample restrictions have no substantial e¤ect on the percentage of director rm-years with
attendance problems.
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We include a set of board, director, and rm characteristics that are related to director
attendance behavior. For example, Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) argue that, as
directors accumulate more directorships in other rms, they could become too busy to carry
out their duties. This suggests that directorsopportunity cost of time increases with more
directorships. Thus, we include the number of board positions held in other rms as a control,
along with a directors tenure on the board, age, and retirement status. We include some board-
level controls such as the meeting fee, total director compensation excluding meeting fees, the
number of board meetings, board size, and the fraction of independent directors on the board.
Because independent directors are supposed to improve governance, we expect that director
attendance behavior should improve with greater board independence. Finally, in the set of
rm-level controls we include the two performance measures, Tobins q and ROA, a proxy for
rm size (the natural logarithm of sales), and the volatility of stock returns. All regressions
include year dummies. All standard errors are corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and, in
the specications without rm xed e¤ects, group correlation within directorship (director-rm)
units.
We report the results in Table 3. In Column 1, we nd that the coe¢ cient on the female
dummy is negative and statistically signicant, which suggests that female directors are less
likely to experience attendance problems than male directors.6 We report the marginal e¤ect of
the female dummy, evaluated at the means of the data, beneath its z-statistics in Column 1. We
can use this to assess whether the gender e¤ects are also economically signicant. The results
in Column 1 suggest that, if a director is female, the likelihood she has attendance problems
decreases by 0.007. Given that the fraction of attendance problems in our data is 0.024, this
means that women are roughly 30% less likely to have attendance problems than men.
(Insert Table 3 about here)
6To ensure that this result is not driven by the fact that most female directors are classied as independent
and independent directors could have better attendance records than a¢ liated directors, we perform a robustness
check by restricting the sample to independent directors. The results are similar. The coe¢ cient on the female
dummy in the restricted sample is -0.113 with a p-value lower than 1%. If we include rm xed e¤ects in the
restricted sample of independent directors as in Column 2, the coe¢ cient on the female dummy becomes -0.008
with a p-value of 1%. Thus, independence does not appear to be driving our results.
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Our results could be driven by omitted unobserved rm characteristics, such as corporate
culture. Some rms could be more likely to appoint women to their boards and could also
encourage better attendance behavior of directors. To control for this possibility, in Column 2
we estimate a linear probability model of the specication in Column 1 and include rm xed
e¤ects. The coe¢ cient estimate on the female dummy is the same as before (0.007, which is
equal to the marginal e¤ect in Column 1) and remains signicant at the 1% level. Thus, the
results are robust to the inclusion of rm xed e¤ects.
Our conclusion is that, even after controlling for director characteristics such as indepen-
dence, age, tenure, retirement status, and number of other directorships, female directors appear
to behave di¤erently than male directors. This is consistent with a large experimental literature
arguing that women are intrinsically di¤erent from men (Croson and Gneezy, 2004). However,
it is also consistent with the Kanter (1977) theory of tokenism. She argues that, because tokens
are more visible, they are under more performance pressure. This can leave them to perform
worse than members of the numeric majority but can also induce better performance at the
individual level.
3.1.2. Attendance: interactive e¤ects due to the presence of women on the board
For gender diversity to have an impact on board governance, it is not su¢ cient that female
directors behave di¤erently than male directors.7 Their behavior should also a¤ect the working
of the board. This begs the question, does the presence of women on boards a¤ect the behavior
of male directors?
3.1.2.1. Does the presence of women a¤ect the behavior of male board members?
In Column 3 of Table 3, we examine whether the attendance behavior of male directors is
a¤ected by gender diversity by replicating the analysis of Column 1 after restricting the sample
to male directors and including the fraction of female directors among the explanatory variables.
The coe¢ cient on the fraction of female directors is negative and statistically signicant at
the 5% level. A one standard deviation increase in the fraction of female directors, 0.083,
7For example, Kanter (1977) argues that the contrast between tokens and the numeric majority could lead
to the social and professional isolation of tokens, which suggests that tokens need not have an impact.
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is associated with a 0.002 reduced likelihood that a male director has attendance problems.
The fraction of male directors with attendance problems in our data is also 0.024. Thus, this
amounts to a 9% reduction in male director attendance problems. Male directors have fewer
attendance problems the more diverse is the gender mix on the board.
In Column 4 we add rm xed e¤ects. The results are qualitatively similar. The point
estimate for the marginal e¤ect of the fraction of female directors is larger than in Column 3,
but it is now signicant at only the 10% level.
The results suggest that the overall attendance behavior of directors improves the more
women are on the board. We conrm this by regressing the total number of directors named
as having attendance problems in a given year on the fraction of women on the board and
the rm-level averages of all other right hand side variables from Column 1 including industry
dummies. The coe¢ cient on the fraction of women is -0.328 and signicant at the 1% level.
Similarly, the total number of male attendance problems is negatively and signicantly related
to the fraction of female directors.8
3.1.2.2. Peer e¤ects or gender e¤ects?
One reason that men have better attendance on boards with more women could be because
directors behave di¤erently when their peers are more dutiful, regardless of gender. Thus, an
interesting question is whether the better attendance of men on more diverse boards is due
to the presence of more dutiful directors (peer e¤ects), the presence of women (pure gender
e¤ects), or both.
To examine this question we compare the attendance behavior of male directors in the
presence of female directors to their attendance behavior in the presence of new male directors.9
Newly appointed male directors could wish to make a good impression, at least initially, so that
they have better attendance records than male directors with long tenures. We provide evidence
consistent with this hypothesis in Column 1 of Table 4. We use the entire sample of directors
including directors appointed in the current year and replicate the probit specication of Table
8For the sake of brevity, we do not report these additional regressions. They are available upon request.
9We thank Stacey Kole for suggesting this comparison.
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3, Column 1, after including a dummy indicating newly appointed directors. The results show
that newly appointed directors have better attendance than incumbent ones. Moreover, the
better attendance of new directors is not driven by more female appointees, because we control
for gender. Nor is the e¤ect of gender on attendance signicantly a¤ected by the inclusion of
this variable.
(Insert Table 4 near here)
Because newly appointed directors have better attendance, we can test for peer e¤ects by
estimating the e¤ect that newly appointed male directors have on incumbent male directors.
In Column 2, we report the results of a probit specication as in Table 3, Column 3, but now
adding the fraction of newly appointed male directors to the set of explanatory variables. We
nd that the fraction of new male directors appears to reduce the likelihood of attendance
problems, which is consistent with the peer e¤ects hypothesis. However, this e¤ect fails to be
statistically signicant at conventional levels. The e¤ect of the fraction of female directors on
male attendance problems remains negative and statistically signicant, suggesting the existence
of a pure gender e¤ect. In unreported results, we also nd that newly appointed women do not
have better attendance than incumbent women, thus the better attendance behavior of women
is not simply a newcomer e¤ect.
Using the fraction of new male appointees as a proxy for peer e¤ects could be problematic.
Years with high turnover could be special in the sense that everyone works hard to help the new
directors. Thus, even the statistically insignicant negative e¤ect of the fraction of new male
appointees could be due to this special year e¤ect. In Column 3, we replicate the specication
in Column 2 using the one-year lag of the fraction of new male directors as the proxy for peer
e¤ects. The lagged variable should be less contaminated by the special year e¤ect, if such an ef-
fect is short lived. The results are essentially the same. The gender variable reduces attendance
problems, but the peer e¤ects variable does not display a statistically reliable e¤ect.10
Another possibility that could confound the interpretation of the results is that director
10We also replicated specications 1 to 3 with xed e¤ects (not reported for the sake of brevity). The results
are similar, with a slight drop in signicance of the female e¤ect (similar to Table 3).
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turnover could improve attendance because low-attendance directors are more likely to be
replaced. In such a case, the fraction of new men or the fraction of women could appear
to improve attendance simply because directors with good attendance records are replacing
directors with poor attendance records.
To address this concern, in Column 4 we reestimate the specication in Column 2 after
restricting the sample to male directors who have a prior history of attendance problems, i.e.,
directors who have had attendance problems at least once during their tenure. This sample
restriction leaves 4,174 usable observations (the probit retains only 2,987 of these). Despite
the small sample size, we still nd a signicant e¤ect of the fraction of female directors, but
no signicant e¤ect of the fraction of new male directors. This indicates that the e¤ect of
female directors is not simply due to turnover, but that the presence of female board members
improves the attendance behavior of their male counterparts.11
Our evidence appears to be counter to the view that women board members are mere
tokens. Although better attendance need not imply improved decision making, attendance is
an important mechanism by which directors obtain the information necessary to carry out their
duciary duties. Thus, the presence of women could inuence board behavior in ways that can
lead to better governance.
3.1.2. Committee assignments: do they vary by gender?
Unlike the board as a whole, board committees such as audit, nominating, corporate gover-
nance, and compensation committees specialize in narrowly dened tasks. The audit committee
generally recommends the appointment of independent auditors and periodically consults with
them on matters relating to internal nancial controls and procedures. It is responsible for
reviewing the scope of proposed audits and internal audit reports. The nominating committee
generally considers the size and composition of the board. It reviews and recommends candi-
dates for election as directors. The corporate governance committee considers corporate gover-
nance matters, which could include any policies and practices with respect to the functioning
11In a previous version of this paper, we also show that the better attendance behavior of male directors on
gender-diverse boards does not seem to be driven by observable characteristics of female directors, such as age,
tenure, retirement status, or number of other directorships. We omit these results here for the sake of brevity.
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of the board, such as nominating directors or setting director compensation. The compensa-
tion committee generally reviews, approves and administers compensation of employees above
a certain salary level, and it reviews management proposals relating to incentive compensation
and benet plans.12
Not all rms have each of these committees. In such cases, some committees perform mul-
tiple functions. For example, when both corporate governance and compensation committees
exist in the same rm (36.4% of cases in our sample), director compensation is usually set by
the former while CEO compensation is set by the latter. But in cases in which there is no cor-
porate governance committee, the nominating committee often acts as a corporate governance
committee that is responsible for setting director pay. In our sample, the nominating committee
exists in 49.3% of rm-years in which rms have no corporate governance committee.
It is plausible that directors who sit on such committees are more likely to inuence board
governance due to their input into these aspects of monitoring and goal setting. Thus, we
examine whether committee assignments vary by gender in our sample. To do so, we restrict
our director-level sample to nonexecutive directors and rms that have at least one of the afore-
mentioned committees. In Table 5, we report estimates of the parameters of linear probability
models in which the dependent variable equals one if a director sits on each of the audit, nom-
inating, corporate governance, and compensation committees, respectively. We use the same
controls as in the attendance regressions but now add a measure of poor attendance behavior,
the fraction of years a director was named as having attendance problems from his or her rst
appearance in the sample, up to and including the current scal year. All specications include
rm xed e¤ects and year dummies and all standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
(Insert Table 5 near here)
In Column 1, the dependent variable indicates whether a given director sits on at least
one of these four key committees: audit, compensation, nominating, and corporate governance.
Consistent with expectations, directors with poor attendance records are less likely to sit on
12This summary is based on our reading of descriptions of committee tasks in proxy statements from a sample
of 352 Fortune 500 companies in 1998.
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key monitoring committees. We also nd that, all else equal, the likelihood female directors
sit on at least one of these committees is 3.5 percentage points higher than for male directors.
From Column 2 we see that female directors are 5.2 percentage points more likely to sit on
audit committees than men. Because the unconditional probability a director sits on an audit
committee is 39%, this implies that women are 7.5% more likely to sit on audit committees than
men. Column 3 shows that the situation is di¤erent for compensation committees. Women are
3.3 percentage points less likely to sit on such committees. However, as shown in Columns 4
and 5, women are more likely to sit on nominating and corporate governance committees (2.0
and 5.1 percentage points, respectively)
We conclude that women are over-represented on monitoring-related committees. The fact
that the proportion of women on committees (9.61%) is higher than the proportion of women on
boards suggests that boards deploy women to committees more often than not. An important
exception to this pattern is the compensation committee, which is responsible for designing the
compensation contracts for the rms senior executives. Because women are less likely to serve
on compensation committees, we expect that the gender composition of boards should not be
a major determinant of CEO pay.
3.2. Gender diversity and board-level governance
Our evidence on board inputs shows that women attend more meetings and are more likely
to be assigned to monitoring-related committees than men. If women also participate actively
at board and monitoring committee meetings, they could increase the monitoring intensity of
the board. In this subsection, we address this issue by examining whether the presence of
women a¤ects observable governance choices. We focus on two important ways of providing
incentives in rms: retention decisions and compensation contracts.
3.2.1. CEO turnover and gender diversity
The sensitivity of CEO turnover to stock return performance could be considered a measure
of the intensity of board monitoring. Weisbach (1988) provides evidence that CEO turnover is
more sensitive to performance when boards have a large fraction of outside directors. Here we
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investigate the impact that women have on the performance-turnover sensitivity.
We dene CEO turnover as a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO leaves the CEO
position the following year.13 We restrict our sample to turnover events that are not classied
by ExecuComp as turnover due to CEO death. Our results are robust to also excluding turnover
events that are classied as retirements. Our measure of stock performance is the rms raw
return for the year net of the CRSP value-weighted index, both compounded continuously. By
construction, our variable denitions imply a lag of one year between poor performance (and
other rm variables) and CEO departure. Other than standard rm-level controls, we control
for CEO characteristics that could a¤ect turnover, such as age, tenure, gender, stock holdings,
and CEO-Chairman duality.14 To control for the possibility that some rms have tougher
governance and, as a result, exhibit both higher CEO turnover-stock return sensitivity and a
greater proportion of female directors (for example, because the rm values better attendance
by directors), we include rm xed e¤ects in all regressions. We also include year dummies and
correct all standard errors for heteroskedasticity.
In Column 1 of Table 6, we nd that, as expected, poor stock return performance increases
the likelihood of CEO turnover. The fraction of female directors does not appear to have a
signicant e¤ect on turnover. In Column 2, we interact Stock Performance with the fraction
of women. We now nd that, in rms with relatively more female directors, the sensitivity of
turnover to performance is higher.
(Insert Table 6 near here)
To assess the hypothetical e¤ect of gender quotas on the intensity of board monitoring, we
can perform some back-of-the-envelope calculations. For example, what would be the impact
of a Norway-type of quota on a rm that currently has no women on its board? For a rm
13To create this variable, some cleaning of the data was necessary. We identied the CEO as the person
who holds the CEO position and who is an inside director. IRRC sometimes had two people indicated as CEO
(49 cases). We cleaned these cases by comparing them to ExecuComp whenever possible. When that was not
possible, we chose the executive who did not also hold the chair position as CEO, because the chairman is likely
to be an outgoing, former, or retired CEO. We also dene CEO turnover to be missing in the nal year of the
sample.
14The source for all CEO characteristics except CEO tenure is IRRC. IRRC indicates the date directors are
appointed to the board, not the date they are appointed to their current position. Thus, we take CEO tenure
data from ExecuComp.
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with no female directors, a one standard deviation fall in stock performance (-0.47) increases
the probability of CEO turnover by 9.87 percentage points. In contrast, in a rm in which
40% of directors are women, the probability of CEO turnover after a similar fall in performance
increases by 15.23 percentage points. This is a very large e¤ect, especially compared with the
unconditional probability of CEO turnover in the sample in Table 6, which is just 8.98%.
In Column 3, we also add interactions between the fraction of independent directors and
stock performance. This interaction enters with the expected negative sign but fails to be statis-
tically signicant. The e¤ect of the interaction between gender diversity and stock performance
remains unchanged.
We conclude that the fraction of women on boards appears to be an important determinant
of the turnover-performance sensitivity. This e¤ect is more robust than the e¤ect of indepen-
dent directors. After controlling for the fraction of women, director independence no longer
appears to have an important impact on the sensitivity of CEO turnover to stock return per-
formance. Our results thus suggest that female directors appear to be tougher monitors than
male directors.
3.2.2. Director pay and diversity
In this subsection, we examine the relation between director pay and gender diversity at
the rm level. We focus on two aspects of director pay: the fraction of equity-based pay they
receive and their total pay. We examine the fraction of equity-based pay because shares and
options could provide more performance-based incentives than xed cash compensation.15 We
also examine total pay, although theory does not provide a clear prediction for the correlation
of total pay with better governance. On the one hand, better governed rms are less likely to
overpay their directors. On the other hand, if better governed rms have more equity-based
pay, standard principal-agent theories predict that they should also have higher total pay to
compensate for extra risk (or due to limited-liability constraints).
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7, we analyze the relationship between the fraction of equity-
based pay and gender diversity. Because the fraction of equity pay is bounded between zero
15Directors do not receive performance-based bonuses paid in cash.
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and one, we use its logtransform (i.e., the log odds ratio) as our dependent variable. If the
fraction is z, our dependent variable is ln( z
1 z + "), where " is a very small number we add to
ensure we do not attempt to take the logarithm of zero. The results are similar if we do not
use this specic transformation. Standard principal-agent theory suggests that volatility should
be a key explanatory factor for the fraction of equity-based pay. In addition to volatility, our
controls include board size, board independence, log(sales) as a proxy for rm size, the number
of business segments as a proxy for rm complexity, Tobins q, and ROA. We use rm xed
e¤ects to address the concern that diversity is endogenous due to omitted time-invariant rm
characteristics, such as corporate culture. It is plausible, for example, that some rms are more
progressive than others, so they have more incentive-based pay for directors as well as more
female directors. All specications include year dummies and, in the specications without
rm xed e¤ects, two-digit SIC dummies. The standard errors are corrected for potential
heteroskedasticity and, in the specications without rm xed e¤ects, group correlation within
rms.
Reverse causality is also a concern. To address it, we used IV methods to estimate the e¤ect
of female directors on director compensation. The results are very similar, so we do not report
them to economize on space. We leave the discussion of the instrument we use for the fraction
of female directors for Section 4, where we report IV estimates for the diversity-performance
relation.
(Insert Table 7 about here)
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The
coe¢ cient on the fraction of women is positive and statistically signicant at the 5% level.
The coe¢ cients on the control variables are generally consistent with expectations. Board
independence is positively correlated with the fraction of equity pay. Volatility is also positively
related to equity pay. Although this appears contrary to principal-agent theory, which argues
that performance pay should decrease with more uncertainty, it is not inconsistent with the
di¤ering e¤ects of volatility estimated in the literature (see, e.g., Prendergast, 2002).
In Column 2, we reestimate the specication in Column 1 (excluding industry dummies)
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with rm xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient on diversity is still positive and now signicant at the
1% level. This suggests that the e¤ect of gender diversity on performance pay for directors is
not driven by unobservable time-invariant rm characteristics. It is perhaps also interesting
to note that, with rm xed e¤ects, the e¤ect of volatility on equity-based pay is negative, as
predicted by principal-agent theory, suggesting that omitted variables can explain the puzzling
result we nd in Column 1.
In Columns 3 and 4, we replicate our analysis in Columns 1 and 2 after replacing the
dependent variable with the natural logarithm of total director compensation. The results from
the OLS specication in Column 3 suggest that the fraction of women is negatively related
to total compensation, although the coe¢ cient is not signicant. However, the coe¢ cient
on gender diversity in the xed e¤ects specication in Column 4 is positive and signicant
at the 10% level. Because the sign of the coe¢ cient on gender diversity changes with xed
e¤ects, omitted rm variables appear to be an important source of endogeneity. This suggests
that the true e¤ect of gender diversity is positive. It is not clear whether more total pay for
directors is consistent with better governance. However, principal-agent theory predicts that
total pay should rise with the amount of performance pay to compensate for risk. Because
gender diversity is positively related to the fraction of equity-based pay, the results for total
pay also seem consistent with theory.
We conclude that strong evidence exists that the proportion of female directors is associated
with more equity-based pay for directors, which is suggestive of a board that is more aligned
with the interests of shareholders. We also nd some weak evidence of higher total director
compensation in boards with relatively more female directors.
3.2.3. CEO pay and gender diversity
In Table 8 we replicate the previous analysis for Total CEO Compensation and Fraction
CEO Incentive Pay. In addition to the same controls as in Table 7, we include CEO charac-
teristics such as age, tenure, gender, and CEO-Chairman duality. Unlike in Table 7, we nd
no statistically signicant e¤ect of the fraction of female directors on either the fraction of
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incentive pay or the level of CEO pay.
(Insert Table 8 near here)
CEO contracts are fairly heterogenous and complex, thus the compensation committee is
likely to spend considerable time and e¤ort discussing their details. Because women are less
likely to be appointed to the compensation committee than men, they do not have as much
inuence over the design of CEO compensation as their male counterparts. However, they are
more likely to sit on the corporate governance and nominating committees, which are generally
responsible for determining director compensation. Thus, it is not surprising that the fraction
of women on boards appears to a¤ect director pay but does not seem to be an important
determinant of the structure of CEO compensation.
4. The impact of gender diversity on performance
The results from Section 3 suggest that boards with more female directors are characterized
by the potential for greater participation of directors in decision making (through attendance
and committee assignments), by tougher monitoring of the CEO (through greater turnover-
performance sensitivity), and by more alignment with the interests of shareholders (through
equity-based compensation). In this section we examine whether gender diversity impacts
corporate performance.
Tougher monitoring, more incentive alignment, and potentially greater participation by
directors in decision making could have both positive and negative e¤ects on corporate per-
formance. Because boards are seen as essential to overcoming agency problems between man-
agers and shareholders, the literature generally argues that stronger governance should increase
shareholder value (see the survey by Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). However, some theoret-
ical papers also argue that too much board monitoring can decrease shareholder value (e.g.,
Almazan and Suarez, 2003). Adams and Ferreira (2007) point out that greater interference by
directors in decision making could lead to a breakdown in communication between managers
and directors. If greater participation by directors leads to more interference, gender diversity
22
in the boardroom could negatively a¤ect performance. The literature on diversity also has am-
biguous predictions for the e¤ect of diversity on performance (see the survey by Milliken and
Martins, 1996). Our results suggest that female directors are not mere tokens, thus they could
be able to add value by bringing new ideas and di¤erent perspectives to the table. However, the
more dissimilar directors are, the more they could disagree and the more conict there could be
on the board. Thus, although the CEO turnover results suggest that some aspects of decision
making could improve in more diverse boards, this need not be the case for other aspects of
decision making. Because the predicted e¤ect of gender diversity on performance is ambiguous,
the net e¤ect must ultimately be determined empirically.
We estimate a simple model of performance that includes the fraction of women on the board,
board size and independence, log(sales), the number of business segments, year dummies, and
two-digit SIC industry dummies. We correct the standard errors for group correlation within
rms and heteroskedasticity. We use two measures of performance: Tobins q and ROA. The
results for Tobins q are in Column 1 of Table 9. Consistent with the positive relation between
gender diversity and performance shown in previous studies, the coe¢ cient on diversity is
positive and signicant at the 10% level. To address omitted variables problems, we add
rm xed e¤ects in Column 2. Once we add rm e¤ects, the coe¢ cient on diversity remains
statistically signicant at the 10% level, but the sign is now negative. This suggests that the
positive correlation between diversity and performance in Column 1 is driven by omitted rm
specic factors.
(Insert Table 9 near here)
Reverse causality is also a concern for the performance regressions because of potential
sorting of male and female directors to rms based on performance. To address this concern,
we need an instrument that is correlated with the fraction of female directors on the board, but
(essentially) uncorrelated with rm performance, except through variables we control for. In
the context of governance regressions it is usually di¢ cult to come up with valid instruments,
because the factors that are arguably most correlated with the endogenous variable are other
governance characteristics that are already (or should be) included in performance regressions,
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such as board size, independence, etc. Thus, our approach is to nd a variable that previous
literature has not yet considered as an explanatory variable in performance regressions.
One reason that is often provided for the absence of women on boards is their lack of
connections. Medland (2004), for example, argues that the most important impediment to
female directorships is that the informal social network linking directors consists primarily of
men. This suggests that the more connected male directors are to women, the more female
directors should be observed. This idea is the basis for our instrument. While we cannot
observe informal social connections between male and female directors, we can observe networks
that occur because directors sit on multiple boards within our sample. Thus, we dene our
instrument as the fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards on which there
are female directors. We argue that, the greater this fraction is, the greater the gender diversity
on the board should be. Thus, this instrument should be correlated with the endogenous
variable. We test this below. However, to be a valid instrument it must satisfy the second
condition for an instrument, that it is uncorrelated with performance except through control
variables included in the regression. One possibility is that the fraction of men connected to
women is correlated with performance through industry e¤ects. To address this possibility,
we control for rm xed e¤ects. Another possibility is that our instrument is a proxy for
the connectedness of the board, which could be correlated with performance. To address this
possibility, we conrm that our results are not sensitive to controlling for two more direct
measures of board connectedness in our performance regressions: the total number of external
board seats by directors and the total number of male external board seats (results not reported
in the tables).
We also considered variations of this instrument, such as the fraction of total board seats
in other rms with female directors. Our results are similar with these measures, but the
correlation of our chosen instrument with gender diversity is much higher, probably because
these other measures count female board connections as well. These could have less of an
inuence on gender diversity.
To address the fact that gender diversity could be endogenous in the xed e¤ects specication
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in Column 2 of Table 9 due to reverse causality, we reestimate this specication using IV
techniques. The rst stage is reported in Column 3; the second stage in Column 4. From the
rst-stage regression, it is evident that our instrument is correlated with gender diversity (this
e¤ect is signicant at lower than the 1% signicance level). The results from Column 4 are
consistent with those in Column 2, i.e., the coe¢ cient on gender diversity remains negative and
is now statistically signicant at the 5% level. The Hausman test statistic for the hypothesis
that the fraction of female directors is uncorrelated with the error term of the performance
regression in Column 2 is -2.17. Thus, we reject the null that diversity is exogenous even
after including rm xed e¤ects. This test further stresses the importance of addressing the
endogeneity of diversity in performance regressions.
To address endogeneity problems that arise because past performance could inuence board
diversity, we also present one-step Arellano and Bond estimates of the specication in Column
2 augmented by one-period lagged Tobins q in Column 5. In this specication we use two and
all further period lagged Tobins q and one period lags of all right-hand-side variables except
for year dummies as instruments. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. The
coe¢ cient on diversity is no longer statistically signicant in Column 5. However, it is still
negative.
The conclusion we draw from Table 9 is that the positive correlation between performance
and gender diversity shown in prior literature is not robust to any method of addressing the
endogeneity of gender diversity. If anything, the relation appears to be negative.16
In Table 10 we replicate the analysis in Table 9 for ROA. As for Tobins q, we conrm the
positive relation between gender diversity and ROA in OLS regressions with industry controls
(Column 1). As for Tobins q, this relationship is not robust to any method of addressing the
endogeneity of diversity. Instead, the coe¢ cient on diversity is negative and signicant in the
xed e¤ects and IV specications and is negative, although not signicant, in the Arellano
and Bond specication. As for Tobins q, our results remain robust to controlling for the total
16Although that is not the main focus of their paper, Bøhren and Strøm (2007) also nd a negative e¤ect of
diversity on performance for Norway.
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number of external board seats of directors and the total number of male external board seats.
For example, if we control for the total number of male external board seats, the coe¢ cient on
diversity in the second stage is -76.9 and is signicant at the 5% level.
(Insert Table 10 near here)
Given that our previous ndings suggest that more gender-diverse boards have stronger
governance, these results imply that, on average, tough boards do not improve rm value. But
they do not imply that tough boards never add value. There is no reason to expect tough
boards to add value in all rms. The value of a tough board should depend on the strength of
the other governance mechanisms. If rms have otherwise strong governance, having a tough
board could lead to overmonitoring. But if rms have otherwise weak governance, we would
expect tough boards to be particularly valuable.
To examine this hypothesis, we use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index
as a proxy for the strength of rmsother governance mechanisms. This index is the sum of 24
indicator variables, each of which measures whether a rm has a particular charter provision,
bylaw provision, or state of incorporation law that makes it more di¢ cult for the rm to be
taken over. A higher value for this index indicates a rm that is more insulated from takeovers
and one in which, ceteris paribus, one might expect agency problems to be higher. From our
perspective, the benet of using this index as a measure of governance is that it measures
a completely di¤erent set of governance mechanisms than the ones we examine above. The
average value of the index in our sample is 9.177, with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 19.
In Table 11, we rerun our performance regressions after including two new variables: the
governance index and the product of the index and the fraction of female directors. We report
both rm xed e¤ects regressions as well as Arellano and Bond one-step estimates. We omit
IV estimates because we do not have an instrument for the governance index. In Columns
1 and 2, we rst report rm xed e¤ects estimates for Tobins q and ROA regressions that
include the governance index. Consistent with the idea that this index is a measure of agency
costs, its coe¢ cient is negative and statistically signicant in both columns. In Columns 3
and 4, we include the interaction between the governance index and gender diversity. In these
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regressions, the coe¢ cient on the governance index is still negative, the coe¢ cient on diversity is
negative, but the coe¢ cient on the interaction is positive and signicant at the 10% level. This
suggests that diverse boards add value in rms with otherwise weak governance. In Columns
5 and 6, we replicate this analysis using Arellano and Bond estimates. The results in Column
5 are consistent with those in Columns 3 and 4. The results for ROA in Column 6 provide no
additional information because no variable is signicant.
(Insert Table 11 near here)
Our interpretation of the results is that gender-diverse boards appear to be tougher monitors.
Consistent with the idea that overmonitoring could decrease value, gender diversity does not
add value on average. However, gender diverse boards appear to be particularly valuable for
rms with otherwise weak governance.
More generally, the results highlight the importance of addressing the potential endogeneity
of gender diversity. If we do nothing to address the endogeneity of gender diversity, we nd that
diversity has a positive correlation with performance. However, this is not a robust result. Thus,
it should not be the basis of policy or business practice.17 Our results suggest that rms should
not add women to a board with the expectation that the presence of women automatically
improves performance.
5. Final remarks
The gender diversity of the board is a central theme of governance reform e¤orts worldwide.
However, the consequences of changing the gender diversity of the board are little understood.
While a large literature shows that women behave di¤erently in a variety of settings, ex ante
it is not clear whether women also should be expected to behave di¤erently than men in
the boardroom. In this paper, we provide some new evidence that female directors behave
17For example, an article in Australias Financial Review Magazine (Turner, 2007) describes one reason that
a chief executive of Deloitte believes there is a business case for employing women as follows: Swiegers was
mindful, too, of a 2001 US study of Fortune 500 companies, which found that those with a high number of
women executives outperformed median competitors in their industry, and that companies that scored best in
terms of promoting women were consistently more protable.
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di¤erently than male directors, even after controlling for observable characteristics. We also nd
that the gender composition of the board is positively related to measures of board e¤ectiveness.
Female directors appear to have a similar impact as the independent directors described in
governance theory do.
Our results highlight the importance of trying to address the endogeneity of gender diver-
sity in performance regressions. Although a positive relation between gender diversity in the
boardroom and rm performance is often cited in the popular press, it is not robust to any
of our methods of addressing the endogeneity of gender diversity. The true relation between
gender diversity and rm performance appears to be more complex. We nd that diversity has
a positive impact on performance in rms that otherwise have weak governance, as measured
by their abilities to resist takeovers. In rms with strong governance, however, enforcing gender
quotas in the boardroom could ultimately decrease shareholder value. One possible explanation
is that greater gender diversity could lead to overmonitoring in those rms.
More generally, our results show that female directors have a substantial and value-relevant
impact on board structure. But this evidence does not provide support for quota-based policy
initiatives. No evidence suggests that such policies would improve rm performance on average.
Proposals for regulations enforcing quotas for women on boards must then be motivated by
reasons other than improvements in governance and rm performance.
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Table 1  
Summary statistics. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 86,714 director level observations from 1,939 firms for the period 
1996—2003, which were both in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. The 
IRRC Director data consist of director-level data for Standard & Poor’s 500, S&P MidCap, and S&P SmallCap firms. Data 
on board meetings, director compensation, and most financial data are from ExecuComp. We obtain additional financial 
information (e.g., standard industrial classification codes, business segment data, and stock returns) from Compustat and 
the Center for Research in Security Prices. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to its book value of assets. 
Market value is book assets minus book equity plus market value of equity. ROA is net income before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations divided by book assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of previous 60-month stock returns. 
Stock Performance is the firm’s raw return for the year net of the CRSP value-weighted index, both compounded 
continuously. The IRRC classifies directors as independent if they have no business relation with the firm, are not related 
or interlocked with management, and are not current or former employees. Total Director Compensation is the sum of the 
annual retainer, the number of board meetings times Board Meeting Fee, and the value of all stock-based compensation. 
Options were priced following the method in ExecuComp. We used the stock price at the end of the month of the firm’s 
annual meeting for the exercise price of the options, as well as to value stock grants. Fraction CEO Incentive Pay is 1 - 
(Salary + Bonus) / Total CEO Compensation. Total CEO Compensation is from ExecuComp and is the sum of Salary, 
Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using Black and 
Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. All compensation numbers have been converted to 2003 
dollars using the CPI-U (consumer price index – all urban consumers). Firm Has Female Director is a dummy variable that 
is one if the firm has female directors in a given year. Firm Has Only One Female Director is a dummy variable that is one 
if the firm only has one female director. Attendance Problem is a dummy variable that is equal to one in a given fiscal year 
if a firm disclosed in its proxy statement that a director attended less than 75% of the meetings he was supposed to during 
that year. Tenure is equal to the number of years the director has served on the board. Retired Dummy is equal to one if the 
proxy indicated that the director retired from his primary occupation. Committee variables are dummy variables equal to 
one if a director sits on a committee of a given type. We show summary statistics for all observations for which Fraction 
Female Directors and the firm’s and board level controls we use in all tables are not missing.  
  
 
Variable 
Number of 
observations 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Firm characteristic 
Sales (millions) 8,253 4,348 9,955 0.32 168,919 
Log(Sales) 8,253 7.26 1.49 -1.15 12.04 
# Business Segments 8,253 5.90 4.97 1 32 
Tobin’s q 8,253 2.09 2.07 0.48 77.64 
ROA 8,253 3.19 16.38 -577.85 59.59 
Volatility 8,253 0.42 0.20 0.10 1.89 
Stock Performance 6,901 -0.038 0.469 -3.77 2.01 
Board characteristic 
Board Size 8,253 9.38 2.68 3 39 
Fraction Independent Directors 8,253 0.63 0.18 0 0.94 
Firm Has Female Directors 8,253 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Firm Has Only One Female Director 8,253 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Fraction Female Directors 8,253 0.085 0.083 0 0.5 
Total Director Compensation (thousands) 8,253 95.89 198.9 0 7,973 
Fraction Equity Pay 8,253 0.395 0.36 0 1 
Meeting Fee (thousands) 8,253 1.03 0.85 0 7.7 
Total CEO Compensation (thousands) 8,114 4,829 13,327 0 580,641 
Fraction CEO Incentive Pay 8,098 0.52 0.27 0 1 
Director Characteristic 
Female Dummy 86,714 0.093 0.29 0 1 
Attendance Problem 86,714 0.024 0.153 0 1 
# Other Directorships 86,714 0.92 1.31 0 10 
Tenure 86,714 9.7 8.1 0 63 
Age 86,714 58.9 8.6 25 98 
Retired Dummy 86,714 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Committee Member 68,235 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Audit Committee Member 68,235 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Compensation Committee Member 68,235 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Nomination Committee Member 68,235 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Corporate Governance Committee Member 68,235 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Comparisons of firms with female directors to those without. 
This table shows comparisons of means of firm-level characteristics for firm-years in which firms have 
female directors to firm-years without female directors, for the sample of complete data resulting from the 
intersection of the Investor Responsibility Research Center Director data, ExecuComp, Compustat, and the 
Center for Research in Security Prices. The number of observations is 8,253. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the 
firm’s market value to its book value of assets. Market value is book assets - book equity + market value of 
equity. ROA is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by book assets. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of previous 60 month stock returns. *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level. 
 
Firm characteristic 
Mean for firm-years with 
female directors, n=5,006 
Mean for firm-years without 
female directors, n=3,247 
 
Difference 
Log(Sales) 7.78 6.47 1.309*** 
# Business Segments 6.58 4.87 1.715*** 
Tobin’s q 2.03 2.19 -0.165*** 
ROA 4.52 1.16 3.36*** 
Volatility 0.37 0.50 -0.126*** 
Board Size 10.37 7.85 2.514*** 
Table 3 
Relation between attendance problems of directors and gender diversity in director-level data.  
 The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of director data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996—2003, which were both in the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. We exclude inside directors from the sample, as 
well as all directors in a given fiscal year who were appointed that year. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the director was named in the proxy as having attended less than 75% of meetings during the previous fiscal year. 
Compensation measures are quoted in 2003 dollars. Total compensation excludes meeting fees. Columns 1 and 3 show results 
from probit regressions; Columns 2 and 4 show results from linear probability (ordinary least squares) models. The specifications 
in Column 1 and 3 include two-digit standard industrial classification industry dummies. The specifications in Columns 2 and 4 
include firm fixed effects. All specifications include year dummies. The sample is restricted to male directors in Columns 3 and 4. 
Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity and for group correlation at the directorship (director-firm) level in 
regressions without firm fixed effects. Absolute values of robust z-statistics are in brackets. Marginal effects for the female 
dummy and the fraction of women on the board are reported in parentheses in the probit regressions. The effect of the constant 
term is omitted. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels, and ^ indicates that coefficients are 
multiplied by ten thousand. The number of observations varies because of perfect predictability of the dependent variable. 
 Dependent variable: attendance problem 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female Dummy -0.116*** -0.007***   
  (-0.007) 
[3.00] 
[3.04]   
Fraction Female Directors   -0.417** -0.035* 
   (-0.026)  
[2.12] 
[1.71] 
Meeting Fee -0.043*** -0.001 -0.045*** -1.25^ 
 [2.66] [0.34] [2.64] [0.07] 
# Other Directorships 0.055*** 0.004*** 0.061*** 0.005*** 
 [6.00] [6.59] [6.14] [6.69] 
Total Compensation  -1.05^ -0.001** -0.63^ -0.001* 
 [1.38] [2.26] [0.88] [1.89] 
# Board Meetings -0.020*** 3.03^ -0.018*** 0.001 
 [4.63] [1.01] [3.90] [1.56] 
Board Size 0.036*** 0.002*** 0.037*** 0.002** 
 [7.07] [2.69] [6.87] [2.35] 
Fraction Independent Directors -0.189** 0.020** -0.202** 0.021** 
 [2.42] [2.31] [2.44] [2.29] 
Tenure -0.009*** -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.001*** 
 [3.80] [5.04] [3.56] [4.67] 
Age -0.002 -1.72^ -0.002 -1.57^ 
 [1.11] [1.52] [0.73] [1.27] 
Retired Dummy -0.129*** -0.006*** -0.132*** -0.006*** 
 [3.87] [3.44] [3.79] [3.17] 
Log(Sales) -0.043*** -0.003 -0.037*** -0.003 
 [3.80] [1.04] [3.02] [1.04] 
Tobin’s q -0.009 -3.64^ -0.014 -0.001 
 [1.20] [0.79] [1.53] [1.59] 
ROA 1.25^ 0.04^ 4.62^ 0.47^ 
 [0.14] [0.05] [0.48] [0.60] 
Volatility 0.138 -0.005 0.118 -0.006 
 [1.39] [0.42] [1.13] [0.46] 
Number of observations 63,998 65,480 56,951 58,302 
R2  0.07  0.08 
Sample type Full Full Men only Men only 
Industry  effects Yes No Yes No 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Table 4  
Differentiating the effect of gender on attendance problems from the effect of new male directors.  
 The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of director data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996—2003, which were both in the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. We exclude inside directors from the sample. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the director was named in the proxy as having attended less than 75% 
of meetings during the previous fiscal year. New Director is a dummy equal to one if the director was appointed in the current fiscal 
year. Fraction New Men is the ratio of nonexecutive male directors who were appointed in the current year to board size. Other 
sample characteristics are as in Tables 1 and 3. All columns show probit regressions. We exclude all directors in a given fiscal year 
who were appointed that year in Columns 2—4. The sample is further restricted to male directors in Columns 2 and 3. In Column 4 
the sample is restricted to male directors with nonzero lagged Fraction of Years with Attendance Problems, which is defined to be 
the fraction of sample years a director was named as having attendance problems from his first appearance on a board up to and 
including the current fiscal year. All specifications include year and industry dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and group correlation at the directorship (director-firm) level. Absolute values of robust z-statistics are in brackets. 
Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels, and ^ indicates that coefficients are multiplied by ten 
thousand. The number of observations varies because of perfect predictability of the dependent variable.  
 Dependent variable: attendance problem 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction Female Directors  -0.426** -0.461** -0.996* 
  [2.17] [2.18] [1.76] 
Fraction New Men  -0.211  -0.19 
  [1.12]  [0.35] 
Lagged Fraction New Men   -0.072  
   [0.38]  
Female Dummy -0.113***    
 [2.93]    
New Director -0.922***    
 [8.79]    
Meeting Fee -0.042*** -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.081* 
 [2.61] [2.66] [2.86] [1.67] 
# Other Directorships 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.026 
 [5.97] [6.14] [5.43] [1.05] 
Total Compensation  -1.16^ -0.63^ -0.43^ -1.52^ 
 [1.50] [0.88] [0.42] [0.69] 
# Board Meetings -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.011 
 [4.68] [3.87] [3.14] [0.73] 
Board Size 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.02 
 [6.95] [6.91] [5.79] [1.37] 
Fraction Independent Directors -0.184** -0.200** -0.186** -0.644*** 
 [2.38] [2.41] [2.05] [2.81] 
Tenure -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.006 
 [3.79] [3.56] [3.21] [1.00] 
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 4.16^ 
 [1.02] [0.74] [0.88] [0.07] 
Retired Dummy -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.149*** -0.214** 
 [4.01] [3.79] [3.99] [2.29] 
Log(Sales) -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.065* 
 [3.73] [3.02] [2.69] [1.80] 
Tobin’s Q -0.009 -0.014 -0.012 -0.053* 
 [1.18] [1.53] [1.09] [1.74] 
ROA 1.87^ 4.62^ 0.003* 0.013*** 
 [0.21] [0.48] [1.76] [3.00] 
Volatility 0.143 0.122 0.176 0.539* 
 [1.46] [1.16] [1.48] [1.93] 
Number of observations 67,183 56,951 44,721 2,987 
Sample type Full Men only, not 
newly appointed 
Men only, not 
newly appointed 
Men with past attendance 
problems, not newly appointed 
 
Table 5  
The assignment of women to committees. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of director data from 1,939 firms for the period 1998—2003, which were both in 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. We exclude inside directors from the 
sample. For each committee type we also restrict the sample to firms that have a committee of that type. The dependent variable 
in Column 1 is a dummy indicating whether a director is a member of the nominating, compensation, audit, or corporate 
governance committee in a given year. For each committee type, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether 
a director is a member of that committee in a given year. Fraction of Years with Attendance Problems is defined to be the 
fraction of sample years a director was named as having attendance problems from his first appearance on a board up to and 
including the current fiscal year. Other sample characteristics are as in Table 1. All columns show linear probability (ordinary 
least squares) models with firm fixed effects and year dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity. 
Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels, 
and ^ indicates that coefficients are multiplied by ten thousand. The number of observations varies because of perfect 
predictability of the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Dependent variable 
 
Committee 
member 
Audit 
committee 
member 
Compensation 
committee 
member 
Nominating 
committee 
member 
Corporate 
governance 
committee member 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female Dummy 0.035*** 0.052*** -0.033*** 0.020*** 0.051*** 
 [7.34] [7.19] [4.79] [2.72] [5.38] 
Fraction of Years with 
Attendance Problems 
-0.054*** 
[3.42] 
-0.121*** 
[6.38] 
-0.009 
[0.46] 
0.012 
[0.52] 
0.032 
[1.02] 
# Other Directorships 0.010*** -0.011*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 
 [8.45] [6.09] [14.49] [12.66] [10.57] 
# Board Meetings -3.33^ -0.001 -0.001 -2.18^ -0.001 
 [0.43] [0.55] [0.46] [0.17] [0.38] 
Board Size -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 [12.39] [9.65] [9.83] [6.25] [4.80] 
Fraction Independent Directors 0.025 -0.052* -0.032 0.002 -0.042 
 [1.11] [1.74] [1.09] [0.06] [0.80] 
Tenure 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
 [4.52] [5.54] [5.81] [18.20] [9.21] 
Age 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 [17.06] [4.25] [13.27] [10.21] [9.95] 
Retired Dummy -0.033*** -0.007 -0.010* -0.020*** -0.024*** 
 [7.90] [1.19] [1.76] [3.14] [2.85] 
Log(Sales) 0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.009 -0.035** 
 [0.11] [1.00] [0.75] [0.71] [1.99] 
Tobin’s q 0.65^ -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 
 [0.05] [0.32] [0.93] [1.09] [0.75] 
ROA -1.84^ -0.78^ -0.58^ 1.96^ 4.70^ 
 [1.19] [0.31] [0.24] [0.60] [1.07] 
Volatility -0.044 -0.012 -0.038 0.029 -0.053 
 [1.49] [0.28] [0.95] [0.61] [0.66] 
Number of observations 54,458 54,397 54,099 41,508 24,853 
R2 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.12 
Table 6  
Firm fixed effects regressions of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover on gender diversity. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm-level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996—2003, which were both in 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. CEO Turnover is a dummy equal to one if the 
CEO leaves the CEO position the following year. CEO turnover is defined to be missing in 2003. The sample is further restricted 
to turnover events that are not classified by ExecuComp as turnover due to CEO death. Stock Performance is the firm’s raw return 
for the year net of the Center for Research in Security Prices value-weighted index, both compounded continuously. CEO Gender 
is a dummy that is one if the CEO is female. CEO Chairman is a dummy that is one if the CEO is also chairman. CEO 
Stockholdings are measured in percent. The source for CEO Age, CEO Stockholdings, CEO Gender, and CEO Chairman status is 
IRRC. The source for CEO Tenure is ExecuComp. Remaining sample characteristics are as in Table 1. All columns report linear 
probability models with firm fixed effects and year dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity. 
Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels, and ^ 
indicates that coefficients are multiplied by ten thousand. 
 Dependent variable: CEO Turnover 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Fraction Female Directors -0.033 -0.042 -0.041 
 [0.26] [0.34] [0.34] 
Fraction Female Directors times Stock  Performance  -0.263** 
[2.41] 
-0.252** 
[2.29] 
Fraction Independent Directors times Stock  Performance   -0.040 
[0.75] 
Stock Performance -0.046*** -0.028** -0.004 
 [4.64] [2.19] [0.10] 
CEO Age 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 [11.03] [11.06] [11.05] 
CEO Stockholdings 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 [2.15] [2.14] [2.14] 
CEO Gender -0.068 -0.069 -0.069 
 [0.60] [0.61] [0.61] 
CEO Chairman 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 
 [3.04] [3.05] [3.04] 
CEO Tenure -3.94^ -4.05^ -4.12^ 
 [0.19] [0.19] [0.20] 
Board Size 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 
 [1.90] [1.86] [1.86] 
Fraction Independent Directors -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** 
 [3.58] [3.59] [3.62] 
Log(Sales) 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 [0.72] [0.67] [0.69] 
# Business Segments 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.51] [0.50] [0.51] 
Volatility -0.05 -0.056 -0.053 
 [0.70] [0.77] [0.73] 
Number of observations 5,774 5,774 5,774 
R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 
 
Table 7  
Ordinary least squares and firm fixed effects regressions of measures of director pay on gender diversity. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996—2003, which were both 
in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. Fraction Equity-Based Pay is the ratio 
of the value of equity pay to total compensation each director receives in a year. Total Director Compensation is calculated as 
the sum of the annual retainer, # Board Meetings times Board Meeting Fee, and the value of all stock-based compensation. 
Remaining sample characteristics are as in Table 1. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is ln((Fraction Equity-based 
Pay / (1 - Fraction Equity-based Pay)) + ε), where ε is a very small number. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is 
ln(Total Director Compensation). The specifications in Column 2 and 4 include firm fixed effects. The specifications without 
firm fixed effects include two-digit standard industrial classification industry dummies. All specifications include year 
dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity and for group correlation at the firm level in regressions 
without firm fixed effects. Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 
0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.  
 Dependent variable 
 Logtransform(Fraction  
Equity-Based Pay) Ln(Total Director Compensation) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction Female Directors 4.536** 4.960*** -0.124 0.372* 
 [2.52] [3.37] [0.55] [1.89] 
Board Size -0.150** -0.112** -0.031*** -0.007 
 [2.26] [2.34] [3.51] [1.11] 
Fraction Independent Directors 5.155*** 0.328 0.329*** 0.007 
 [5.83] [0.50] [2.73] [0.08] 
Log(Sales) 0.827*** 0.741*** 0.192*** 0.350*** 
 [6.28] [3.40] [11.25] [10.89] 
# Business Segments 0.014 0.047** -0.003 -0.006** 
 [0.41] [2.27] [0.73] [2.43] 
Tobin’s q 0.341*** 0.095** 0.072*** 0.024*** 
 [4.04] [1.97] [6.08] [3.41] 
ROA -0.004 0.004 0.001 0.003*** 
 [0.63] [1.16] [1.31] [3.35] 
Volatility 9.575*** -2.635*** 1.744*** -0.298** 
 [9.56] [3.08] [11.67] [2.43] 
Number of observations 7,856 7,983 8,123 8,253 
R2 0.17 0.79 0.28 0.81 
Industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Table 8  
Ordinary least squares and firm fixed effects regressions of measures of chief executive officer pay on gender diversity. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996—2003, which were both in 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. Fraction CEO Incentive Pay is 1-(Salary + 
Bonus) / Total CEO Compensation. Total CEO Compensation is from ExecuComp and is the sum of Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, 
Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using Black and Scholes), Long- Term Incentive 
Payouts, and All Other Total. CEO Gender is a dummy that is one if the CEO is female. CEO Chairman is a dummy that is one if 
the CEO is also chairman. Data on CEO age, CEO gender, and CEO chairman status are from IRRC. CEO Tenure is from 
ExecuComp. Remaining sample characteristics are as in Table 1. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is ln((Fraction CEO 
Incentive Pay / (1- Fraction CEO Incentive Pay)) + ε), where ε is a very small number. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 
is ln(Total CEO Compensation). The specifications in Columns 2 and 4 include firm fixed effects. The specifications without firm 
fixed effects include two-digit standard industrial classification industry dummies. All specifications include year dummies. 
Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity and for group correlation at the firm level in regressions without firm 
fixed effects. Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 
(*) levels, and ^ indicates that coefficients are multiplied by ten thousand. 
 Dependent variable  
 Logtransform(Fraction 
CEO Incentive Pay) Ln(Total CEO Compensation) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction Female Directors -0.156 0.779 0.188 0.271 
 [0.45] [1.47] [0.88] [0.94] 
CEO Age -0.015*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
 [3.21] [0.41] [1.59] [0.22] 
CEO Gender -0.112 -0.295 0.042 0.004 
 [0.42] [0.99] [0.29] [0.03] 
CEO Chairman 0.258*** 0.130** 0.163*** 0.033 
 [4.23] [1.97] [4.56] [0.98] 
CEO Tenure -0.027*** -0.037*** -0.005 -0.005* 
 [4.99] [5.48] [1.64] [1.83] 
Board Size 0.018 0.008 0.016** 0.001 
 [1.36] [0.47] [2.01] [0.13] 
Fraction Independent Directors 0.637*** -0.21 0.238** -0.219 
 [3.54] [0.88] [2.33] [1.59] 
Log(Sales) 0.295*** 0.105 0.443*** 0.378*** 
 [12.08] [1.35] [26.28] [9.17] 
# Business Segments -0.01 -0.022*** -0.006 -0.011*** 
 [1.38] [2.68] [1.57] [2.88] 
Tobin’s q 0.113*** 0.035* 0.089*** 0.045*** 
 [6.17] [1.90] [6.27] [3.27] 
ROA -0.004*** -0.002 -2.23^ 0.001 
 [2.82] [1.24] [0.20] [1.06] 
Volatility 1.560*** 0.009 0.731*** -0.085 
 [7.34] [0.03] [5.83] [0.43] 
Number  of observations 7,411 7,542 7,565 7,697 
R2 0.17 0.55 0.41 0.72 
Industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Table 9 
Performance: Ln(Tobin’s q) and gender diversity.   
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm-level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996—2003, which 
were both in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and ExecuComp. Tobin’s q is the ratio 
of the firm’s market value to its book value of assets. Market value is book assets - book equity + market value of 
equity. Remaining sample characteristics are as in Table 1. The dependent variable in Columns 1—2 and 4—5 is the 
natural logarithm of Tobin’s q. The specification in Column 1 includes two-digit standard industrial classfication 
industry dummies. The specifications in Columns 2—4 include firm fixed effects. Column 3 reports the first stage of an 
instrumental variables (IV) regression with Fraction Males with Board Connections to Female Directors as an 
instrument for Fraction Female Directors. Column 4 reports the results of the IV estimation. Column 5 reports the results 
of an Arellano and Bond one-step regression. All specifications include year dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for 
potential heteroskedasticity in Columns 2—5. Standard errors are adjusted for group correlation at the firm level in 
Column 1. Absolute values of t-statistics or z-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 
(**), and 0.10 (*) levels, and ^ indicates that coefficients are multiplied by ten thousand. 
 Dependent variable 
 
Ln(Tobin’s q) 
Least squares regressions 
Fraction 
Female 
Directors 
Ln(Tobin’s q) 
IV regressions 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fraction Female Directors 0.221* -0.135*  -5.924** -1.895 
 [1.72] [1.67]  [2.21] [0.56] 
Board Size -0.012*** -0.012*** 3.59^ -0.010** -0.103 
 [2.81] [4.14] [0.89] [2.56] [0.89] 
Fraction Independent Directors -0.131** 
[2.29] 
0.04 
[1.11] 
0.051*** 
[9.89] 
0.342** 
[2.32] 
-3.471** 
[2.20] 
Log(Sales) 0.031*** -0.002 0.002 0.011 -0.553** 
 [3.11] [0.17] [1.20] [0.72] [1.96] 
# Business Segments -0.016*** -0.003** 0.63^ -0.003* 0.098*** 
 [7.05] [2.54] [0.35] [1.67] [2.91] 
Fraction Males with Board 
Connections to Female Directors 
  0.015*** 
[3.39] 
  
Lagged Ln(Tobin’s q)     0.480*** 
     [5.50] 
Number  of observations 9,299 9,477 9,477 9,477 5,588 
R2 0.25 0.11 0.08   
Industry dummies Yes No No No No 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regression type OLS Fixed 
effects 
First-stage IV 
with fixed 
effects 
IV with fixed 
effects 
Arellano and 
Bond one step 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Performance: Return on assets (ROA) and gender diversity. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm-level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996—
2003, which were both in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Data and 
ExecuComp. ROA is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by book 
assets. Remaining sample characteristics are as in Table 1. The dependent variable in all columns is ROA. 
The specification in Column 1 includes two-digit standard industrial classification industry dummies. The 
specifications in Columns 2 and 3 include firm fixed effects. Column 3 reports the results of an instrumental 
variables (IV) estimation with Fraction Males with Board Connections to Female Directors as an instrument 
for Fraction Female Directors. The first stage of the IV estimation is the same as in Column 3 of Table 9. 
Column 4 reports the results of an Arellano and Bond one-step regression. All specifications include year 
dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity in Columns 2—4. Standard errors are 
adjusted for group correlation at the firm level in Column 1. Absolute values of t-statistics or z-statistics are 
in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 Dependent variable: ROA 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction Female Directors 6.190* -6.170* -231.409** -159.658 
 [1.89] [1.71] [2.07] [0.81] 
Board Size -0.327*** -0.276** -0.189 4.552 
 [2.84] [2.20] [1.18] [0.67] 
Fraction Independent Directors -3.787***
[2.82] 
1.997 
[1.26] 
13.719** 
[2.24] 
30.618 
[0.28] 
Log(Sales) 2.716*** 4.053*** 4.603*** -25.254 
 [6.09] [8.31] [6.97] [0.86] 
# Business Segments -0.03 -0.063 -0.049 2.332 
 [0.58] [1.10] [0.70] [0.66] 
Lagged ROA    0.271** 
    [2.55] 
Number of observations 9,324 9,553 9,553 5,656 
R2 0.07 0.03   
Industry dummies Yes No No No 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Regression type Ordinary least 
squares 
Fixed effects IV with fixed 
effects 
Arellano- Bond 
one step 
 
 
  
Table 11 
Performance and interaction of gender diversity with the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) shareholder rights index. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firm-level data from 1,939 firms for the period 1996—2003, which were both in 
the IRRC Director Data and ExecuComp. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to its book value of assets. Market value 
is book assets - book equity + market value of equity. ROA is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
divided by book assets. Gindex is the governance index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). This index is the sum of 24 
dummy variables indicating a firm has a provision making it more difficult to be taken over. Data on governance provisions are 
from the IRRC. Remaining sample characteristics are as in Table 1. The dependent variable in columns 1, 3, and 5 is Ln(Tobin’s 
q). The dependent variable in Columns 2, 4, and 6 is ROA. The specifications in Columns 1-4 include firm fixed effects. Columns 
5 and 6 report the results of Arellano and Bond one-step regressions. All specifications include year dummies. Standard errors in 
all columns are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity. Absolute values of robust t-statistics or z-statistics are in brackets. 
Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 Dependent variable 
 Ln(Tobin’s q) ROA Ln(Tobin’s q) ROA Ln(Tobin’s q) ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fraction Female Directors -0.103 -5.036 -0.616* -22.500* -26.472** 1,763.274 
 [0.90] [1.42] [1.87] [1.92] [2.22] [0.83] 
Gindex times Fraction Female Directors   0.055* 1.857* 3.194** -254.522 
   [1.69] [1.78] [2.11] [0.97] 
Gindex -0.015** -0.411* -0.019** -0.561** 0.028 21.625 
 [2.17] [1.70] [2.53] [2.09] [0.10] [0.94] 
Board Size -0.005 -0.243* -0.004 -0.233* -0.189 10.398 
 [1.56] [1.91] [1.46] [1.83] [-1.00] [0.81] 
Fraction Independent Directors 0.013 3.517** 0.012 3.502** -3.970** -96.215 
 [0.28] [2.18] [0.27] [2.17] [2.15] [0.41] 
Log(Sales) 0.02 4.740*** 0.02 4.759*** -0.419 -43.412 
 [1.08] [4.55] [1.11] [4.57] [1.12] [0.98] 
# Business Segments -0.002 -0.023 -0.002 -0.025 0.080* 3.840 
 [1.20] [0.62] [1.24] [0.67] [1.8] [0.83] 
Lagged Ln(Tobin’s Q)     0.299**  
     [2.31]  
Lagged ROA      0.474 
      [1.17] 
Number of observations 7,584 7,642 7,584 7,642 4,508 4,556 
R2 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06   
Regression type Firm fixed 
effects 
Firm 
fixed 
effects 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Firm 
fixed 
effects 
Arellano- 
Bond one step 
Arellano- 
Bond one 
step 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
